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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SIDNEY M. HORMAN, individually
and as partner in HORMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah
partnership, and S.M. HORMAN,
JR. ,
Supreme Court No. 20239

Plaintiffs,
vs.
S. SPENCE CLARK, as general
partner for VALLEY SHOPPING
ASSOCIATES, a Utah limited
partnership,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
S. M. HORMAN, as General Partner
for HORMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah Partnership
and S. M. HORMAN, JR.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in which the
sought

to recover damages for alleged

plaintiff/a^pelIants
breach of a contract

creating an easement granted to them by respondents.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The

lower

court

entered

a

memorandum

decision

and

verdict against the plaintiffs in favor of the defendants of no
cause of action.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The

appellants,

by

this

appeal,

seek

a

decision

reversing the trial court's decision of no cause of action and
directing the trial court to enter a money judgment in favor of
the appellants based upon the evidence presented at the trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this case, the appellants take few, if any exceptions
to

the

facts

therefore

set

as

set

forth

forth
the

in

facts

the
as

Memorandum
found

in

Decision
the

and

Memorandum

Decision. (TRANSCRIPT PAGES 453-458)
Plaintiffs were owners of a tract of land lying north of
and contiguous to the Valley Shopping Center owned by defendant
and located at the northeast corner of the intersection of 4500
South and State Streets in Murray, Utah.

Defendant had acquired

the shopping center from Horman in about 1970.

The tract of land

owned by plantiffs was vacant property being held by plaintiffs
for future development.
Being desirous of obtaining

a break

in the

traffic

control island along State Street to afford access to the center
by southbound traffic, the defendant determined that it could do
so only by dedicating land for construction of a road from State
Street eastward to Fairbourne Avenue.

Defendant thus commenced

negotiations with Horman for a conveyance of a portion of their
respective parcels of land to Murray City
said roadway.

for construction

of

These negotiations culminated in the execution of

an agreement between plaintiff and defendant dated July 5/ 1975/
but which was
Company
until

not signed

by S. M.

Horman

for

the

Construction

until September, 1975, and was not signed

March, 1976.

notary public.

Both

by

defendant

signatures were acknowledged

before a

(See Appendix Exhibit A for entire agreement).

The agreement provided that Horman would deed to Murray
City

the

south

35 feet of

its parcel

of land

running

west for about 460 feet and that defendant would deed
City

the north

15 feet of

its shopping

center

land

east

and

to Murray
from

State

Street to Fairbourne Street; that defendant would obtain a deed
from American Motors to Murray City of the south 35 feet of its
property

fronting on State Street and contiguous

to

parcel on the west, (about 150 feet in length) and
would

not be required

to pave

the, street.

The

Horman's

that

Horman

agreement

also

contained the following provision:
It is understood between both parties
hereto that Property Management and/or
Valley Shopping Center Assoc, will permit
Horman or its assigns with parking
privileges for Horman or Horman invitees
or assigns to park on the parking lot in
the rear of the Valley Shopping Center
in any of the stalls which are used for
public parking.
The agreement

contained

a legal

description

of

the

shopping

center property.
Both parties
agreement.

However,

had a signed
upon

final

and

notarized

execution

of

copy

the

of

the

agreement

neither party had the agreement recorded in the County Recorder's
office and it remained unrecorded until January 12, 1978, when S.
M. Horman came upon the agreement in his files and took it to the
Recorder's office where, upon determining that it had never been
recorded, he then recorded it.
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However, on March 15, 1977, a real estate

exchange

agreement was executed by six parties, namely Sterling Furniture,
Modern

Enterprises,

W.

Meeks

Wirthlin

and

wife,

Prowswood,

Auerbachs and defendant by which defendant agreed to and did
convey

its

interest

in

the

Valley

Shopping

Center

to

the

Wirthlins, subject only to a first mortgage ($423,329)/ to a
mortgage to Murray City that secured defendant's obligation to
pave

the

street/

and

restrictions

of record."

deposit

March

by

15,

to

"encroachments,

The agreement
1977

a

easements

required

preliminary

and

defendant

title

report

to
by

Associated Title Co. showing good and marketable title in Valley
and a warranty deed conveying the Center to the Wirthlins.

This

requirement was met and the warranty deed contained the provision
that the property was subject, among other things, to "easements,
covenants,
reservations

restrictions,
appearing

of

rights
record

or
or

way/

encroachments

enforceable

in

law

and
or

equity."
Since the agreement between plaintiff and defendant had
not been recorded as of March 15, 1977, and was not recorded
until March 12, 1978, as stated supra, no mention thereof was
made in the title report.

The agreement of March 15, 1977,

reserved $46,000 from the funds to be paid to defendant to cover
the cost of paving the roadway to be built upon the land conveyed
to Murray City, and which in fact was constructed and completed.
The warranty deed to the Wirthlins was recorded on March
15, 1977 by the title company handling the real estate exchange.
Thereafter the Wirthlins sold their interest in Valley Shopping

-5Center

to Arnold Development who

in turn

sold

it to G. G.

Finlayson and Janet F. Griffin who owned the center at the time
of trial.
At the time Korman recorded
parties

in March/

the agreement between the

1978/ he made no inquiry

as

to the

then

ownership status and thus did not know of the sale of the center
by defendant to the Wirthlins.

In 1980 the Horman property was

conveyed to S. M. Horman, Jr./ as trustee for his family and he
then undertook to develop the property for business purposes.
Horman, Jr., obtained a building permit from Murray City
about July 1, 1980, and commenced to build the outside walls with
the intent to complete 20 interior units as lessees were obtained
so

each

leased

unit

could

be

installed

accordance with the desires of each lessee.

and

completed

in

The building permit

records of Murray City left something to be desired, but minutes
of a commission meeting dated May 1, 1980 reflected that Horman
had explained that off-street parking for his building would be
provided on a lot located on the south side of 4370 South Street,
the street Duilt pursuant to the agreement between the parties.
As
building

Horman

proceeded

the difficulty

with

the

construction

leading to the filing

of

the

of this lawsuit

began to take shape when Finlayson learned in some way of the
apparent parking easement which resulted
attorney

dated

September

requesting an adjustment
reported easement.

30,

1980,

to

in a letter by his
Arnold

Development

in the purchase price because of the

A copy of this letter was designated for

Horman Construction Co.

On November 17, 1980, Finlayson1s lawyer
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wrote a letter to Horman Construction attaching a copy of a
letter written by Associated Title Co. dated November 3, 1980,
which expressed the view that because of the late recording of
the agreement between plaintiff and defendant, any easement for
parking granted therein was ineffective against the Wirthlins and
the subsequent purchasers.

By letter dated December 30, 1980, S.

M. Horman responded thereto and continued to assert the easement
was valid and discussed in detail the problems that would arise
should the Horman business development lose its parking spaces.
In the months that followed, Murray City issued a stop
order on the construction; building

plans were

altered

and

off-street parking spaces were constructed on the Horman property
but these were about 22 spaces short of meeting the Murray City
ordinance requirements for parking; negotiations were undertaking
by the Hormans with Finlayson to obtain spaces in the center; and
leases were let based upon Murray City's approval
construction for a 57% occupancy.

of interior

The negotiations for parking

in the center's parking lot between plaintiffs and defendant did
not result in a successful conclusion so this lawsuit was filed
March 16, 1981, and at the time of trial the occupancy allowance
remained

the

same

and

the

negotiations

between

Horman

and

Finlayson were still being pursued as they had been during the
period 3 1/2 years.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT

ONE.

ESTABLISEHED

THE

AGREEMENT

A VALID

EASEMENT

IN

BETWEEN
FAVOR OF

THE

PARTIES

PLAINTIFFS.

POINT TWO.
THE RECORDING STATUTE IS NOT RELEVANT TO
DEFENDANT'S CONTRACTUAL DUTIES TO PLAINTIFFS.
POINT THREE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
RESPONDENT CLARK DID NOT BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH
APPELLANT.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES ESTABLISHED A VALID EASEMENT IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS.
Generally, an easement is an interest in land

in and

over which is to be enjoyed, and is distinguishable

from a

license, which merely confers a personal privilege to do some act
on the land.
Where

LOGAN V. McGEE, 320 So. 2d 792 (Miss. 1975).
a

license

is

coupled

with

an

interest,

the

interest conferred is not merely permission but amounts to a
grant or an easement.

ULAN v. VEND-A-COIN, INC., 558 P.2D 741

(Ariz App 1976). Corbin states further:
"It is clear, if the owner of land contracts to give
another person an irrevocable privilege of user for a
substantial period, the transaction is more than a
mere license. Such person gets an interest in land
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within
cludes
easily
Corbin

the Statute of Frauds. The interest then inmanifold rights against third persons and
attains the dignity of the name easement."
on Contracts.

Thus, whether an instrument conveying a right to use the property
of another, conveys an easement or lecense depends upon the
intent of the parties.

This can be interpreted from the language

used and from the surrounding circumstances, viewed n light of
the applicable rules of law and intent.

COOPER v. BOISE CHURCH

OF CHRIST OF BOISE, 524 P.2d 173 (Idaho 1974).
It is clear from the following language that what was
intended

to

be

conveyed

between

Valley

and

Horman

was

an

easement:
"Property Management and/or Valley Shopping Center Associated will permit Horman or its assigns with parking
privileges for Horman or "Horman ' s invitees to park on
the parking ]ot in the rear of the Valley Shopping
Center in any of the stalls which are used for public
parking."
The right was granted
revocable.

to Horman or its assigns.

It is not

This clearly indicates that an interest in land was

granted rather than merely * personal privilege.
Further^cie, the agreement between Valley and Horman met
the formal leqal requirements and created a valid contract right
for a transfer of interest in land.

There existed certainty of

terms and certainty of the tract to be conveyed.

The agreement

was reduced to writing and signed by the parties, thus satisfying
the

Statute

of

Frauds.

Corbin

on

Contracts

has

clearly

established that:
"an easement is a combination of legal relations of
such importance effecting an use and enjoyment of land
that any contract providing for the creation of an
easement is within the Statute." (referring to the
Statute of Frauds)
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In the case of HAYNES v. HUNT, 85 P.2d 861 (Utah 1939),
the

Utah

Supreme

Court

found

a

license.

However,

in

describing the creation of an easement, the court said that
whether a grant creates an easement is to be determined from the
intention of the parties as gathered
instrument.
intention.

from the language of the

The grant should be construed to carry out that
If the language is uncertain or ambiguous, the courts

look to the surrounding circumstances.
It is clear in this case that what the parties intended
to create was an easement.

That was their clear

intent as

demonstrated by their negotiations and as stated in the written
agreement, and the agreement should be interpreted in light of
the intent of the parties.
POINT TWO
THE RECORDING STATUTE IS NOT RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT'S CONTRACTUAL
DUTIES TO PLAINTIFFS.
It is clear from the Memorandum Decision of Judge Croft
that he was swayed heavily in his decision on plaintiff's breach
of contract cla^.n by the plaintiff's failure to record the
parking agreement (See pages 8-10 of the Memorandum Decision
Appendix Exhibit B ) . In so doing, the trial court has misapplied
the Utah law as it applies to the parties to the recordable
contract.
Plaintiffs concede that the agreement between Horman and
Valley was not recorded prior to the sale of the property to
Wirthlins.

The Wirthlins were thus bona fide purchasers as they

took without actual nor constructive notice of Horman's claim.
Bona fide purchasers rules, or the public records doctrine, are

-10-

to

protect

innocent

third

parties

such

as

the

Wirthlins.

However, these rules are not for the protection of a breaching
party.

The Public Records Doctrine states that the law:
"Was intended to protect innocent third parties who
have no knowledge of the existence of any rights
and/or claims against the property by allowing them
to take free and clear of any such unrecorded claims."
MOTWANI v. FUN CENTERS, INC., 388 So. 2d 1173 (La.
App. 1980).
The failure to record had no effect on the obligations

of the parties to the agreement.

The Utah Supreme Court held in

the case of MITCHELL v. PALMER, 240 P.2d 970 (Utah 1952), that a
deed need not be acknowledged
thereto.

to be valid between

the parties

The Court relied on Section 78-1-6 of the Utah Code

which provides that a conveyance of real estate must be recorded
in order to impart notice.

However, it further stated that, even

without the recording, the conveyance shall be valid and binding
between

the

parties

thereto

without

such

proofs,

acknowledgements, certification, or record.
The District Court of California further stated:
"An unrecorded deed is valid between the parties
thereto and persons who have notice thereof."
WINEBERG v. MOORE, 194 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Cal. 1961).
Thus, whether the conveyance was recorded or not, has no bearing
on

Horman's

claim

for

breach

of

contract

by

Clark.

The

conveyance was binding as to the parties thereto and a breaching
party cannot rely upon a recording statute to establish his
innocence of a breach.
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POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT CLARK DID NOT
BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH APPELLANT.
In every contract there exists a duty of good faith and
fair dealing.

The Restatement Second, Section 205 states:

"Every contract imposes upon each party, a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
in its enforcement."
The Utah Supreme Court further explained

in TANNER v.

BAADSGAARD, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980):
"When the parties have entered into a formal contract,
such as for the purchase of real property, it is to be
assumed that they will cooperate with each other in
good faith for its performance, and one refusing to
so perform, or claiming a forfeiture thereof, has the
burden of showing the justification for doing so."
The Tanner case was an action for a specific performance for the
sale of undeveloped property lots.

This was certainly analogous

to the sale of the easement right in the present case.

The Utah

Supreme Court has clearly found that there exists a duty of good
faith in a property interest transaction.
In the case of FERRIS v. JENNINGS, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah
1979), the record owner of property brought an action to evict
the

Defendant

Counterclaim

from

the

asserting

premises.

The

Defendant

that she had a right

filed

a

to possess the

property and to purchase it under an oral agreement with the
record owner.

In holding for the Defendant, the Court stated:

" . . . parties to a contract are obligated to
proceed in good faith, to cooperate in performing
the contract in accordance with its expressed intent."
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In light of the above, it is obvious that there existed
in the agreement between Valley and Horman a duty of good faith.
The parties had a duty to cooperate and to fairly deal with one
another.

Valley's obligation of fair dealing and good faith

resulted

in

privileges.

the

obligation

of

permitting

Horman

parking

This is not an implied term/ it is the very essences

of the contract.

The Restatement Second, Section 235 says:

"When performance of a duty under a contract is due,
any non-performance is a breach."
The Defendant here clearly breached the parking agreement by
granting two conflicting interests in the same property.

As

Corbin has stated:
"Nevertheless; a contract created duties, . . . "
and a breach of contract may be committed by pre=
vention, hinderance or repudiation."
In In Re DILLON v. MORGAN 362 So. 2d 1130 (La. App.
1978), the vendor was trying to reserve one-half of the mineral
rights on property he had previously sold for himself after no
reservation had been made in the original contract.

The Court

there stated:
"A seller should not be allowed to obligate himself
to deliver and to warrant title and peaceful
possession to a buyer of a thing and then by his
own act or claim derogate from, or assert rights
to the thing, contrary to his obligations."

The Georgia

Supreme Court

in considering

situation, make the obvious declaration:

a similar

-13-

"It is axiomatic that after a grantor has sold land
to one grantee, he cannot thereafter convey legal
title to the same land to another grantee." PEARSON
v. SHADIX, 229 S.E. 2d 653 (Ga. 1976).

The breach of contract alleged by Appellants is not
complicated.

The Respondent first bargained and sold a part of

their property to the Appellant and then less than twelve months
later sold

the same property/

together with

other

property

rights, to another party for additional consideration.

In so

doing/ the Respondent received double consideration and created
conflicting

property

rights

negotiations with Wirthlin7

among

the

Respondent

purchasers.
never

informed

In

the

Wirthlin

that he had sold part of the property rights to Appellant nor did
he reserve in any of the contracts or deeds any rights for the
Appellant.
The Respondent now argues that there is nothing improper
in his conduct.

He argues that Appellant's failure to record

voided the contract/ thereby enabling him to sell the property to
another party.

This theory is indeed novel and is without any

authority in either law or equity.
It is common practice in this State
Estate Contracts not to be recorded.

for Uniform Real

If Respondent's proposition

is adopted, then a Seller of real property can sell his property
successively ad infinitim receiving new consideration from each
buyer and then maintain that he is protected and exonerated from
any

of

his

contractual

obligations

to

any

of

the

buyers

-14because no one recorded.
contractual

claims

from

He would, thus, not be subject to any
any

of

the

buyers.

Obviously,

such

a

position is obsurd, yet it is the one precisely maintained by the
Respondent.
The

courts

have repeatedly

held

avoid a performance of an obligation
beyond

his control

by placing

or by his own voluntary

STEVENS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, INC., 560 P.2d
CORP. v. HUEY, 15 Cal 2d 711, 104 P.2d
SMITH, 194 P.2d
239 Or 41

that a party

cannot

his performance

act,

see

CANNON

v.

1383; PACIFIC VENTURE

641

(1940);

ZOGARTS

v.

143; 86 CA 2d 165; MORH v. SEARS 395 P.2d 117,

(1964).
In a similar

case, a father

tried

to avoid

a

contract

for the sale of his property

to his son by

selling

party.

the Defendant

had a duty

The Court

repudiate

or

make

conveying

his land

held

that

performance

impossible

or

more

to a third

person, see THOMPSON

to a

third

not

to

difficult

by

v.

THOMPSON

460 P.2d 679, 1 Wash. App. 196 (Wash 1969).
In the case of MARLOW

INVESTMENT C O R P . v. R A D M A L L , 26 UT

2d 124, 485 P.2d 1402 (1971), this Court in considering a breach
of

contract

case

on multiple

sales

the breach of contract occurs when
ownership

or title and

of property,

concluded

the seller has not

can no longer

fulfill

his

that

lost

his

contract.

In

that case, the Court concluded that the buyer's right to sue for
breach

of contract

conveyed

the

property to someone else after making an original deal with

the

Plaintiffs.

ripened when

the

seller

had

-15-

The Utah Supreme Court's position in JOHNSON v. BELL,
666 P.2d

308

(Utah 1983), provides

Appellant's position.

excellent

authority

for

This was an action to quiet title to

certain real property or, in the alternative, to recover damages.
The Court found that the Plaintiff's claim to title under an
unrecorded Quit-Claim Deed was not valid and binding as to the
Defendant's

Trust

Deed.

successors in interest

The Plaintiffs

in

this

to the original purchasers.

found that since there had been no contractual

suit

were

The Court

relationship

between the Plaintiff and Defendant, no contractual liability was
present.

The Court said that:
If any cause of action for damages exist against
Bell (the Defendant) because of breach of some
contractual duty, such cause of action would be
owned by the original grantees and not by the
Plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 312)

Thus, the Court recognized a contractual cause of action for
damages based upon a contract bewteen the original gtantor and
the original grantee.

It is this contractual cause of action

upon which Plaintiffs' claim is based.

SUMMARY
In summary, the contract agreement satisfied all legal
requirements and created a valid easement.
existed a contract duty of good

faith and

Consequently, there
fair dealing

failure to comply with that duty constituted a breach.
a clear breach
(Respondents)

of contract

gave

two

created

conflicting

when

the

interests

There was

selling
in

and

the

party
same

-16-

property.

There exists an enforceable contract right between the

parties for the conveyance of an interest in land.

The failure

to record has no effect upon the parties right to damages for
breach of that contract.

Respectfully submitted,

NTZE & BROWN
.ghland Dr., #202
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Attorney for Appellants
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THIS AGREEMENT, entered into this 7th day of July, 1970, by and
between Valley Shoopinq Center Assiciates
State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as

of Salt Lake County,
"Valley"

and

HORMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
hereinafter referred to as Horman.
WITNESSETH:
Valley

is desirous of opening up a road through from

State Street to Fairbournc Street.
Herman owns a parcel of land located immediately north of the Valley
Shopping Center building runninq easterly to Fairbourne Street.
Horman hereby agrees to deed to Murray City the south strip of
this land 35 feet wide running east and west approximately 460 feet.
Property Management ownst;he Valley Shopping Center located

UL

i*L*

',&,*+#

immediately south of the Horman property and the American Motors

,. ,

property and Valley Shopping Center agrees to also deed a 15 feet
wide strip of land running from State Street on the west to Fairbourne on the east making a 50 foot right-of-way for a road from
State Street through to Fairbourne.
It is also understood that Prooerty Management will obtain a deed
from American Motors.

Herein American Motors will deed 35 feet

of the south end of their property running from State Street east
to the llornan property.

Thus permitting a thoroughfare through

from State Street easterly to Fairbourne.
It is understood between both parties hereto that Property Management and or Valley Shopping Center, Assoc, will permit Horman or
it 3 assigns with parking privileges for Horman or Horman invitees ov «.«il?uto park on the parking lot in the rear of the Valley Shopping Ccnttr
in any of the stalls which are used for public parking,
it i« agreed by l>oth parties hereto thai each ptrty has paid unto
the nt.'ier party SI0.00 ,ip.d other good r^d valuable consideration,
a receipt of whieh Is herehy acknowledged.

It ii hereby agreed

and understood that
HUT yiojman
iiorman >will not bo rocmired to psvo the street.

'jifinv

Shoprunq C r n t e r A s s o c i a t e s

HERMAN CONPTRVCTIOW OWPANV

S, M. Horman, Pruftident
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HORMAN, ET AL V.
CLARK, ET AL

PAGE EIGHT

MEMORANDUM DECISION

subject to the parking privileges under the contract was a breach
of duty not to interfere.
The agreement had all the necessary requirements for
recording -- acknowledged signatures and property description -and it is thus readily apparent that had Horman recorded the
agreement in March, 1976, after Clark signed it for defendant,
it would have constituted notice to all that the contracted for
parking rights were an encumbrance upon the property and would have
been included in the provisions of the quoted language set forth
in the preceding paragraph.

Horman has had long experience in

the acquisition, construction, management, sales and leasing of
real property and to him the necessity of recording the agreement:
to protect his interest in the parking iicilities at the center
•T-ust have been well known to him and understood by him.
done so, this lawsuit would never have been filed.

Had he

Having failed

to cio so, can plaintiffs now shi •: t the rospor,. iblity to defendant
tor the problems and damages that followed?
While it may be true as alleged by plaintiffs that defendant
had a duty not

"to interfere" with the contractual rights of

the plaintiffs, neither the sale of the property by defendant
nor defendant's tailure to either itself record the agreement
nor to specifically mention the encumbrance in its deed to Wirthlins
constitutes an interference with plaintiffs1 contract rights.
*'he tact that. t. he Wirthlins wore bona fide purchasers for value

EXHIBIT B - Page 1

HORMAN, ET AL V.
CLARK, ET AL

PAGE NINE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

without notice of the unrecorded contract was the determining
factor in precluding plaintiffs from retaining the parking privileges
provided for in the contract.
I find no duty upon the defendant to have recorded the
agreement.

In real estate transactions, it is a grantee's rights

that are given protection by the recording statutes and that
protection can only be obtained by the recording.

I think the

responsibility for doing so falls upon the grantee and such has
long been the practice in real estate transactions.

The law

neither requires nor is it customary that a warranty deed conveying
real property specifically list all of the valid, existing encumbranc
of record.

That is why title companies exist and that is why

buyers and sellers both look to title reports to reveal such
encumbrances of record.
There is no evidence in this case that defendant knew
the agreement, with plaintiff had not been recorded when defendant
entered into the six-sided real estate exchange agreement under
which defendant sold to the Wirthlins, nor is there any convincing
evidence that defendant knowingly or intentionally failed to
disclose the parking privilege encumbrance when that real estate
exchange agreement was negotiated.

As stated supra, both the

exchange agreement and the warranty deed to the Wirthlins contained
provisions that would have preserved the parking privilege had
Herman promptlv recorded the agreement.

Plaintiffs abandoned

thei: prior '-laim that -}<> I • -riiant breached an oral agreement to
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HORMAN, ET AL V.
CLARK, ET AL

PAGE TEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

record the agreement and indeed there was no implied duty to do so,
nor any obligation to make certain that Horman had done so.
I thus find no breach of duty by defendant under the agreement
and must enter a verdict against the plaintiffs and in favor of
the defendant of no-cause of action.

Having so ruled, the issue

of damages need not be further considered.
Counsel for defendant shall prepare appropriate Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment unless the parties by written Stipulation
otherwise agree as provided in Rule 52(c).
Dated this

^?£~~

day

of

Juiy

'

i9

34:

-Al—
BRYANT' H. L K U M
DISTRICT JUDGE (Retired)

EXHIBIT B - Page 3

